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• Population of players
(not necessarily rational) 
• Subgroups meet and interact
• Strategies: Types of behaviour
• Successful strategies spread in 
population
Evolutionary Game Theory
Free Rider Problem
Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778):
Stag Hunt Metapher
Social dilemmas
A ‘Common Good’ Game
4 players
may contribute up to 20 dollars to common pool
Experimenter doubles common pool
Divides it equally among the 4 players
Herrmann, Thöni,
Gächter (Nature 2009)
‘Peer Punishment’
After each round, players can impose fines on 
each other
A punished player loses 3 dollars per fine
Punishers pay a fee of 1 dollar for each fine
(costly punishment)
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Sanctions provide incentives to contribute
But players can free-ride on sanctions provided by 
others
Opting out?
If game is voluntary,
players can abstain from joint enterprise.
Non-participants do something on their own.
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Four strategies:
(a) don’t participate
(b) participate, but do not contribute (free riders)
(c) participate, contribute, but not to sanctions 
(second order free riders)
(d) participate, contribute, punish (pro-social)
Voluntary games
non participants
1st order free riders
2nd order free riders
pro-social
Voluntary vs. compulsory games
non participants
1st order free riders
2nd order free riders
pro-social
‚Governing the Commons‘
‚Institutions are tools that
offer incentives to enable
humans to overcome
social dilemmas‘
Pool punishment
Yamagishi (1986) etc:
Players contribute G to punishment funds
before the Public Good game
Free riders pay fine B
Again, emerges only if game is voluntary
(Sigmund, De Silva, Nowak,Traulsen, Hauert, Nature 2011) 
Conclusion
Whether in conditions of anarchy
(peer punishment, i.e., self-justice)
or if institutions provide the sanctions,
voluntary participation promotes cooperation
(a social contract strengthens authorities)
No rational deliberation, just social learning
Social contract
Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau:
‚Man is born free, 
and everywhere men
are in chains‘


